CHICAGO | European leaders are no longer treating doubts about American reliability as a temporary problem to be managed through another election cycle. They are beginning to build institutions, budgets and partnerships designed to function even when Washington is unwilling to lead.
From reassurance to risk management
For decades, European security policy rested on a durable assumption: the United States might argue with allies, demand more spending or change tactics, but it would remain the indispensable guarantor of NATO’s collective defense.
That assumption has weakened. A recent survey reported by Reuters found that only a small minority of Europeans now describe the United States as an ally, while majorities in the countries surveyed questioned whether Washington would defend them in a crisis.
Public opinion does not determine treaty obligations, but it affects whether governments can continue building policy around promises their voters no longer trust. European leaders are responding by treating U.S. support as an important asset that cannot be the only asset.
Defense spending is only the beginning
The most visible response is higher military spending. European governments are expanding ammunition production, air defense, drone capacity, cyber units and procurement of conventional weapons.
Money alone will not create strategic independence. Europe’s defense market remains fragmented across national industries, procurement rules and incompatible systems. A government can announce a larger budget without producing the shared logistics, command structures and manufacturing capacity required for sustained operations.
The political challenge is therefore integration. Governments must decide which capabilities should remain national, which should be coordinated through NATO and which should be developed through European Union institutions or smaller coalitions.
Digital sovereignty becomes a security issue
Reliability concerns extend beyond weapons. European institutions depend heavily on American cloud providers, software platforms, satellite services and artificial-intelligence systems. That dependence can become a strategic vulnerability if access is restricted by U.S. policy or corporate decisions.
European leaders are investing in sovereign cloud infrastructure, data centers, semiconductor capacity and regulatory systems intended to preserve control over critical services. The objective is not necessarily to exclude American companies. It is to reduce the risk that a political dispute or export restriction can disable essential government and economic functions.
Digital sovereignty also shapes Europe’s regulatory agenda. Rules governing artificial intelligence, online platforms, privacy and cybersecurity are increasingly viewed as elements of national power rather than narrow consumer policy.
Trade diversification and middle-power coalitions
European governments are also widening trade and diplomatic relationships. Canada, Japan, Australia, India and other middle powers offer partnerships that can reduce dependence on either the United States or China.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has argued that middle powers should cooperate rather than compete for favor from larger states. That idea reflects a broader shift: countries with substantial economic and diplomatic influence are looking for coalitions capable of setting standards and defending shared interests without waiting for a single superpower.
Trade diversification will not be simple. Europe remains deeply connected to the American market, financial system and security architecture. China is simultaneously a market, supplier and strategic concern. The goal is resilience, not isolation.
NATO must adapt without pretending nothing changed
NATO remains the central military alliance for most of Europe. The United States still provides capabilities that European states cannot quickly replace, including intelligence, strategic lift, missile defense and nuclear deterrence.
The danger is that political leaders may use familiar alliance language while failing to prepare for a less certain reality. A credible strategy requires both continued engagement with Washington and investment in alternatives.
European safeguards can strengthen NATO if they produce capable allies. They can weaken it if national governments retreat into competing procurement programs or use autonomy as an excuse to avoid collective commitments.
A slower transformation than the headlines suggest
Europe is not severing its relationship with the United States. The economic, military and cultural connections are too extensive, and many leaders still believe American engagement is essential.
What is changing is the default expectation. European governments increasingly want the capacity to continue a policy even if Washington withdraws support, imposes new conditions or changes direction suddenly.
That shift will be measured over years through factories, budgets, cables, satellites, trade agreements and military exercises. It is less dramatic than a formal rupture, but potentially more consequential because it changes how Europe plans for every future crisis.
Additional Reporting By: The Washington Post; Reuters; PBS NewsHour; and Reuters Breakingviews.