World

Congo Senate Advances Constitutional Change That Could Open Door to a Third Tshisekedi Term

The Senate vote begins a process that opponents fear could reset presidential term limits before the 2028 election, though no third term has yet been authorized.

By Amara Okafor · June 16, 2026
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Congo Senate Advances Constitutional Change That Could Open Door to a Third Tshisekedi Term
CGN News / Cook Global News Network / World News / All Rights Reserved

LONDON | The Democratic Republic of Congo's Senate approved legislation Tuesday that could begin a process toward replacing the constitution, a move opponents warn may allow President Félix Tshisekedi to seek another term by resetting the political rules before the next national election.

All 89 senators who cast ballots supported the measure, while 20 senators abstained or did not participate, according to Reuters. The lower house had already approved the proposal. The bill still requires presidential action and would not by itself create a new constitution or extend Tshisekedi's tenure.

The political significance lies in what could follow. Supporters describe constitutional reform as a way to address governance problems in a vast country facing armed conflict, weak institutions and regional inequality. Opponents see an effort to change term-limit rules and reopen the presidential clock before elections expected in 2028.

What the Senate approved

The measure establishes or advances a formal path for examining constitutional change. It is not the final text of a replacement charter. A commission or political process would still have to develop proposals, parliament would have to act on them and voters could be asked to decide in a referendum.

That sequence matters because public discussion has sometimes treated the Senate vote as if a third term had already been authorized. It has not. The vote creates political momentum and institutional machinery that could eventually produce a different result.

The government should publish the exact legislation, implementation schedule and membership rules for any review body. Without those documents, citizens cannot assess whether the process is open-ended, limited to specified articles or designed around a predetermined outcome.

The current constitutional limit

Congo's constitution provides for a president to serve two terms. Tshisekedi won elections in 2018 and 2023, though both contests generated disputes about administration and results. Under the current framework, the term beginning after the 2023 election would ordinarily be his last.

A replacement constitution can create a legal argument that prior terms occurred under a different charter and therefore do not count toward a new limit. Similar arguments have been used in other countries. Whether that interpretation would prevail in Congo would depend on transitional provisions, court decisions and the wording of the final text.

Opponents say changing the rules while the incumbent could benefit undermines the purpose of term limits. Supporters may argue that voters retain the final choice. The deeper issue is whether the process protects competition before the ballot is cast.

Why term limits matter

Term limits are intended to prevent personal rule, encourage leadership renewal and reduce the advantage of controlling state institutions. They do not guarantee democracy, but weakening them can make peaceful transfer of power less likely.

In systems with strong courts, independent election bodies and competitive media, constitutional amendments may be debated without predetermining the winner. Congo's institutions operate under severe pressure, including conflict, patronage and limited state capacity. That context makes procedural safeguards especially important.

A legitimate review would need broad participation, transparent drafting, meaningful opposition representation and enough time for public debate. A rushed process dominated by the governing coalition would deepen suspicion even if a referendum is formally held.

The government's case for reform

Government supporters have argued that the constitution does not adequately address the country's security and administrative needs. Congo is geographically enormous, contains more than 100 million people and has struggled to deliver services across provinces with limited roads and state presence.

Eastern Congo remains affected by armed groups, displacement and regional tensions. Advocates of reform may seek clearer emergency powers, institutional coordination or changes in the relationship between national and provincial government.

Those concerns deserve debate. They do not require eliminating presidential limits. A credible process should separate institutional reforms that have broad support from provisions that directly benefit current officeholders.

Opposition fears a managed outcome

Opposition leaders have warned that the initiative is designed to keep Tshisekedi in power. They point to the governing coalition's strength in parliament and the limited ability of opponents to shape the process.

The concern extends beyond a single article. A new constitution could change election timing, court appointments, legislative powers or eligibility rules. Even provisions that appear technical can alter the balance between the presidency and other institutions.

Opposition parties will have to decide whether to participate, boycott or mobilize against the process. Participation can legitimize a forum they distrust; absence can allow the government to draft without them. International partners should encourage inclusion without dictating Congo's constitutional choices.

Protests and allegations of force

Reuters reported that demonstrations accompanied the vote and that opposition figures alleged security forces used tear gas and live ammunition. One opposition politician said he was injured. Those accounts require investigation and should not be treated as final findings without official records and independent verification.

Authorities have a responsibility to protect peaceful assembly and to distinguish protesters from people committing violence. Any use of force must be lawful, necessary and proportionate. Organizers also have a responsibility to discourage attacks and protect participants.

The government should release arrest numbers, charges and information about injuries. Independent monitors and medical records can help establish what occurred. Suppressing peaceful opposition would damage the credibility of any future referendum.

The role of the courts

Constitutional courts may be asked to review the process, the content of amendments or the eligibility of candidates. Their independence will be central. A court perceived as controlled by the executive cannot provide confidence in a dispute over presidential tenure.

Legal questions may include whether certain provisions are unamendable, whether a replacement constitution can reset terms and whether the legislature followed required procedure. The answers should be based on published reasoning, not political pressure.

Court access must also be meaningful. Opposition parties, civil-society groups and citizens need clear standing and deadlines to challenge violations before an election makes the dispute irreversible.

A referendum is not sufficient by itself

A public vote can confer legitimacy, but only if voters receive accurate information, campaign freely and trust the count. The wording of the question matters. A single yes-or-no vote on an entire constitution can force citizens to accept provisions they oppose in order to obtain reforms they support.

Election authorities would need adequate funding, a credible voter register, observers and transparent results. State media and public resources should not be used to overwhelm the opposition. Campaign rules should provide equal access and protect journalists.

Turnout and regional participation would also matter in a country with conflict and displacement. A formally national referendum that excludes insecure provinces would raise serious questions about representation.

Security pressures can narrow debate

Congo faces real threats in the east, and leaders may argue that unity is more important than constitutional dispute. Yet conflict can also be used to weaken scrutiny or portray dissent as disloyal.

Institutional legitimacy is part of security. Citizens are more likely to cooperate with a state they view as accountable. A contested constitutional maneuver could deepen regional and political divisions at a time when cohesion is needed.

Reform should therefore be designed to strengthen checks, service delivery and local representation rather than concentrate authority in the presidency.

Regional precedents

African countries have experienced repeated battles over term limits. Some leaders have amended constitutions or adopted new charters to remain in office. Others have respected limits and overseen transfers of power.

The African Union and regional organizations have often been cautious about constitutional changes that occur through formally legal processes rather than military coups. That distinction can leave citizens with little protection when democratic competition is narrowed without an outright seizure of power.

Congo's decision will be watched beyond its borders. A transparent, inclusive process could model reform under difficult conditions. A reset designed around one leader could encourage similar efforts elsewhere.

Economic confidence is also at stake

Congo is a major producer of minerals used in batteries, electronics and industrial supply chains. Investors already navigate security risk, infrastructure constraints and governance concerns. A prolonged constitutional crisis could add uncertainty to contracts, taxation and regulation.

That does not mean economic policy should determine constitutional rights. It means predictable rules and peaceful transfers are part of a functioning investment climate. Companies, lenders and development institutions will watch whether the process strengthens institutions or makes policy more dependent on one leader.

International partners should focus on process

Foreign governments have significant interests in Congo's security and minerals, but they should avoid appearing to choose the country's leaders. Their most useful role is to support transparent procedures, civic space, election observation and accountability for violence.

Conditional assistance and diplomatic pressure may be appropriate when authorities violate rights. At the same time, external criticism can be portrayed as interference. Congolese institutions and citizens must remain the principal judges of the charter.

What comes next

The immediate next step is formal action on the bill and the creation of whatever review mechanism it authorizes. The government should announce timelines, membership, public-hearing procedures and the scope of possible changes.

Civil society, churches, lawyers, academics and provincial leaders are likely to demand a role. Their participation can broaden the debate, but only if recommendations can influence the text. Consultation staged after decisions are made would not resolve the legitimacy problem.

The decisive questions remain unanswered: whether presidential term limits will change, whether prior terms would count under a new charter, when a referendum would occur and whether the 2028 election timetable will be preserved.

Religious institutions and community organizations may be especially important because they reach areas where the state and political parties have limited presence. Their ability to convene debate and document abuses should be protected.

A constitutional test before an electoral one

Tshisekedi has not yet received a new term through Tuesday's vote. What he has received is an opportunity to shape the rules governing the end of his current mandate. That makes the process a test of restraint.

If reform is genuinely about improving institutions, the government can protect existing term limits, publish drafts, include opponents and allow independent review. If those safeguards are rejected, the opposition's warning will gain force.

Congo's constitution belongs to its citizens, not to a president or parliamentary majority. The legitimacy of any new charter will depend less on the number of votes cast inside the Senate than on whether the public can debate, challenge and decide its future without coercion. The coming months will show whether constitutional reform becomes a vehicle for broader accountability or a method of extending presidential power behind the appearance of legal procedure, parliamentary majorities and a referendum conducted after the essential choices have already been made by officials with the greatest personal stake in the final national political and constitutional outcome.

Additional Reporting By: Reuters; Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Congo; Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo; Independent National Electoral Commission; Congolese civil-society and opposition statements; African Union.

What This Means

The Senate vote begins a constitutional process; it does not by itself authorize President Tshisekedi to serve another term. The critical issue is whether a new charter would reset term limits and whether citizens can influence the text before a referendum.

Readers should watch the review body's membership, publication of draft language, treatment of protesters and the election timetable. A legitimate reform process would preserve civic space, court access and meaningful opposition participation.

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